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ABSTRACT
The term “central bank independence” (or abbreviated, CBI) can be broadly defined as the degree of 
freedom of the central bank to pursue monetary policy without interference from political considera-
tions. The idea of central bank independence has been widely accepted over the last several decades 
by many countries around the world, both developed and developing. Since being first written about 
academically in the late 1980s, many countries have come to adopt this policy and many governments 
have come to recognize this as standard procedure. As such, many countries around the world gran-
ted autonomy to their central banks during the 1980s and 1990s. The majority of past studies have 
examined primarily the impact of central bank independence on inflation. however, the additional 
theoretical benefits are much more far reaching, the result of a more stable and prosperous ma-
croeconomic environment. Additionally, there is only now sufficient data to empirically determine 
whether many of these claims are true. This study examines central bank independence in developing 
countries of Latin America and Asia as well as selected developed countries to determine what actual 
impact an autonomous central bank has had. It also examines such phenomena as financial crises 
(including the current global crisis of 2008-2009), inflation targeting, legal systems, country develo-
pment and fiscal policy to determine the effects of these items on not only inflation, but the broad 
spectrum of macroeconomic outcomes. Although there is some empirical evidence to support the 
benefits of central bank independence, it is limited in scope to certain areas. 
Keywords: Central Bank Independence. Financial crisis. Latin America. Asia.
JEL Classification Code: Banks. International financial markets.
RESUMO
O termo “independência do banco central” (ou IBC) pode ser amplamente definido como o grau de liberdade 
que o banco central possui para seguir sua política monetária sem a interferência de considerações 
políticas. A ideia da independência do banco central foi aceita nas últimas décadas por muitos países ao 
redor do mundo, tanto desenvolvidos como em desenvolvimento. Desde a primeira literatura acadêmica 
a respeito no final dos anos 80, muitos países começaram a adotar essa política e muitos governos a 
reconheceram como padrão. Assim, muitos países ao redor do mundo concederam autonomia a seus 
bancos centrais nos anos 80 e 90. A maior parte dos estudos existentes investigou principalmente o 
impacto da independência do banco central na inflação. Porém, os benefícios teóricos adicionais vão 
muito além, resultado de um ambiente macroeconômico mais estável e próspero. Ademais, somente 
agora há dados suficientes para a determinação empírica da veracidade de muitas dessas alegações. Este 
estudo investiga a independência dos bancos centrais em países em desenvolvimento na América Latina 
e na Ásia, além de determinados países desenvolvidos, para determinar o real impacto de um banco 
central autônomo. Também examina fenômenos como crises financeiras (inclusive a crise global em 
curso no período 2008-2009), estabelecimento de metas de inflação, sistemas legais, desenvolvimento dos 
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países e política fiscal para determinar os efeitos destes itens não somente na inflação, mas no espectro 
amplo de resultados macroeconômicos. Apesar de haver evidências empíricas para apoiar os benefícios 
da independência do banco central, seu escopo é limitado a determinadas áreas. 
Palavras-chave: Independência do Banco Central. Crise financeira. América Latina. Ásia.
 1 INTRODUCTION
The term “central bank independence” 
(or abbreviated, CBI) can be broadly defined 
as the degree of freedom of the central bank 
to pursue monetary policy without interfe-
rence from political considerations (SIRIVE-
DhIN; hATAISEREE, 2000). In other words, 
independence implies that a nation’s central 
bank can follow a trajectory outside the po-
litical realm and does not have to abide by 
the government’s request to follow a certain 
monetary policy, such as printing money to 
pay for federal deficits (GRUBEN; WELCh, 
1993). Since being first written about aca-
demically in the late 1980s, many countries 
have come to adopt this policy and many 
governments have come to recognize this as 
standard procedure. From the late 1980s to 
the mid-1990s, countries as diverse as Malay-
sia, New Zealand, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, 
Spain, France and Brazil granted their res-
pective central banks more autonomy from 
the government (CUKIERMAN, 1994). ho-
wever, despite this proliferation, highly in-
dependent central banks in many countries 
of the developing world are a relatively new 
phenomenon (BOyLAN, 2001).
The idea of granting a nation’s central 
bank autonomy from the government, al-
though a relatively simple one at first glan-
ce, is powerful in the sense that if a central 
bank is independent in its decision making 
abilities, the government in power at a gi-
ven time will be unable to turn back mone-
tary decisions that have been made or, in a 
similar vein, force actions to be undertaken. 
Thus, in theory, an independent and auto-
nomous central bank should lead to a more 
stable economic environment in the respecti-
ve country (MAXFIELD, 1997). It represents 
a prominent transformation, because it not 
only removes a key aspect of economic de-
cision making from political control, but has 
kept many governmental powers from over-
turning growth-oriented central bank poli-
cies (BOyLAN, 2001).
The primary motive behind the granting 
of such autonomy was the belief that an in-
dependent and sovereign central bank would 
have more power to diminish inflation and 
price volatility and thusly, economic growth 
would be stimulated. According to Cukier-
man (1994), there is widespread consensus 
now that central banks should be indepen-
dent because it helps to achieve price stabili-
ty. This belief stems not only from monetary 
theory but also from empirical studies on 
the subject, both in developed and develo-
ping countries. The traditional argument for 
central bank autonomy is that the power to 
spend money (the government) should be 
separate from the power to print money (the 
central bank).
Although there has been much study 
done on the theoretical rationale behind it, 
few empirical studies, other than those exa-
mining the effects of inflation, have been 
conducted to assess accurately whether cen-
tral bank independence actually leads to 
desirable macroeconomic outcomes. That 
is, although many countries have granted 
autonomy to their respective central bank 
with the hope of not only taming inflation 
and inflation volatility, but also achieving a 
broader spectrum of macroeconomic goals, 
such as low unemployment, sustained GDP 
growth, increased investment, less volatile 
interest rates and further financial market 
liberalization, many of these hopes have not 
been proven empirically, especially in the 
developing world. 
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The focus of this study will be to exa-
mine a select group of countries in three 
defined regions (Asia, Latin America, and 
the Developed West) and identify whether 
the macroeconomic variables of inflation, 
unemployment, and economic growth have 
responded positively since the granting of 
central bank autonomy. 
 2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This study will first use Ordinary Least 
Squares multivariate regression to test for cor-
relation and relationships among the varia-
bles in question. Regressions will be done in 
a time series fashion over the time period un-
der consideration (quarterly data for almost 
50 years, to equal more than 190 observations 
for most time series). The “goodness of fit” 
ratio, or R2, will be used to gauge how well 
each dependent variable is explained by the 
independent variables. The Durbin-Watson 
Test will also be used for autocorrelation. A 
comparison of the R2 and Durbin-Watson test 
will be used as verification that the regression 
is not spurious (as mentioned above, if the 
Durbin-Watson results are quantitatively hi-
gher than the R2, this is a sign that the regres-
sion is not spurious, or non-sensical). Only 
results that are at least at the 10% statistical 
significance level will be listed throughout the 
results section and all will be listed with coe-
fficients. Macroeconomic data from Q1:1960 
to Q1:2009 will be taken entirely from the 
International Monetary Fund (considered a 
highly regarded, neutral, global financial ins-
titution) in order to maintain consistency of 
measurements, data collection processes and 
to avoid biases of individual country central 
banks or national data collection agencies. 
 2.1 Variables
The following independent variables will 
be used to examine the impact of the nuan-
ces (political and economic) of central bank 
independence and related phenomena on 
the previously mentioned dependent varia-
bles. Dummy variables are used frequently to 
classify data into mutually exclusive catego-
ries (GUJARATI, 2003) and will be used in 
the following equations to represent, among 
other things, the effects of country develo-
pment, foreign exchange rate regimes, the 
occurrence of financial crises, the degree of 
international inflation, and the presence of 
legal CBI.
1. Central Bank Independence (Legal 
Date). This is a dummy variable designed to 
distinguish between years in which no cen-
tral bank independence was in place and ye-
ars in which legal central bank independence 
was in existence. Although for most countries 
it takes the value of either 0 (representing no 
legal independence) or 1 (representing full 
legal independence), it also takes the value 
of .5 for countries (such as Brazil) that after 
a certain date were operating under a semi-
independent/informal accord type arran-
gement Source: Individual country central 
bank websites. 
2. Modified Cukierman Index. This is 
a composite CBI index measuring various 
facets of independence. It was originally de-
veloped by Cukierman et al and has been re-
cently updated. It is comprised of 18 criteria 
of political and economic independence with 
a total score ranging from zero to one. Re-
garding political independence, it focuses on 
the appointment and dismissal of the central 
bank’s governor. The specific criteria are the 
following:
a.) Term of office of Governor (more than 
one presidential period, the period does/does 
not coincide with presidential elections, or 
not specified);
b.) Channel through which the governor 
is appointed (via executive and legislative, 
only executive etc.);
c.) Appointment and term of office for the 
rest of the board;
d.) Dismissal of board members;
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e.) Governor allowed to hold another go-
vernment office or not;
f.) Fundamental objective of the central 
bank (price stability, price stability that does/
does not conflict with other economic goals 
etc.);
g.) Channel through which monetary po-
licy is formulated;
h.) Government directives and resolution 
of conflict;
i.) Central bank involvement in debt ap-
proval;
j.) Limitations and advances on central 
bank lending;
k.) Lending to government (not allowed, 
restricted, fully allowed etc.);
l.) Channel through which financing con-
ditions to the government are decided;
m.) Beneficiaries of central bank financing;
n.) Interest rates in advances of lending 
(at market rates, below or above);
o.) Lender of Last Resort;
p.) Financial autonomy;
q.) Accountability of central banks (i.e., 
whom do they report to and how often?);
r.) Central bank transparency (i.e., who 
do they disclose to and how often?) (JáCO-
ME; VáZQUEZ, 2005).
3. Grilli Masciandaro Tabellini (GMT) 
Index. This is a composite index measur-
ing political and economic independence 
in various areas. It was originally devel-
oped by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 
in the early 1990s and has been updated 
since by several authors. According to the 
original creators of this index, credibility 
is the primary asset of having an inde-
pendent central bank (hICKS, 2004). It 
is based on 15 criteria, each with a binary 
score of zero to one. The criteria are then 
simply added together. The specific crite-
ria are the following:
a.) Appointment of the governor (with or 
without government involvement);
b.) Length of time of appointment (grea-
ter than or less than five years);
c.) Appointment of the board of directors 
(with or without government involvement);
d.) Length of time of board appointment 
(greater than or less than five years);
e.) No mandatory participation of govern-
ment representatives on the board;
f.) No government approval required in 
formulating monetary policy;
g.) Requirements in the charter for mone-
tary stability to be a primary objective;
h.) Legal protections for the central bank 
in the event of conflict with the government;
i.) No automatic procedure for the gover-
nment to obtain credit directly;
j.) Direct credit is extended to the govern-
ment at market interest rates;
k.) Credit is extended on a temporary 
basis;
l.) Credit is extended for a limited 
amount;
m.) The central bank does not participate 
in the primary market for public debt;
n.) The central bank is responsible for set-
ting the discount rate;
o.) The central bank has no responsibility 
for overseeing the banking sector (or at least 
shares this with other institutions) (ARNO-
NE et al., 2006). 
4. CB Governor Turnover. This has tra-
ditionally been used in the CBI literature 
as a proxy for independence, with the idea 
being that if there is a high ratio of turnover 
(as measured on a yearly basis), this is an in-
dicator that the central bank is actually un-
der the firm control of the executive branch 
and that the central bank governor will be 
dismissed if he or she does not comply with 
the government’s demands. Therefore higher 
turnover is usually seen as a sign of a lesser 
degree of independence. See Carstens and 
Jácome, 2005, among others. Source: central 
bank websites and author’s own calculations. 
5. Development Dummy Variable (from 
0 to 1 in .1 increments). This measures the 
economic development of the respective 
sample country in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product, with each .1 increment representing 
$3,000 of GDP in constant dollars Source: 
The World Economy: historical Statistics, 
OECD Development Center, 2003. 
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6. Foreign Exchange Rate Regime 
Dummy Variable. This is designed to cap-
ture the effects of a particular type of ex-
change rate system on a country’s economy. 
It takes a value of 0 for pure fixed and 1 for 
pure floating in .1 increments. Sources: Cro-
we and Meade (2008), Musa et al. (2000), 
Baig (2002), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) 
and IMF (2003).
7. Financial Crisis Dummy Variable. 
This is designed to capture the effects of fi-
nancial crises on a country. It takes a value of 
0 for years in which no crisis was experienced 
and 1 otherwise. Sources: Carstens and Jáco-
me (2005) and author’s own calculations.
8. International Inflation Dummy Va-
riable. This is designed to control for the 
effects of international inflation on a coun-
try, with the idea being that many countries 
(including developed ones) are susceptible to 
outside economic forces. It takes a value from 
0 to 1 in .1 increments. Sources: Jácome and 
Vázquez (2005) and IMF Database.  
9. Inflation Targeting Regime Dummy. 
This is devised to capture the effects of Infla-
tion Targeting as either a primary or secon-
dary objective for a nation’s central bank. It 
will take the value of 1 if IT is considered a 
primary objective and .5 if it is considered a 
secondary objective, with the value of 0 gi-
ven for the years prior to IT implementation. 
Additionally, there will be other distinctions 
made, such as if a central bank (or executive 
branch) is monitoring inflation or has a very 
informal inflation goal, but has not made a 
formal commitment to the Inflation Tar-
geting framework. Also, for those that have 
formally committed to IT, a distinction will 
be made between a changing yearly inflation 
target and a fixed target (i.e. the same goal 
over the course of many years), with the latter 
taking a higher value. Sources: Stone (2003), 
Agbeja (2007), central bank websites. 
10. Government Consumption as a Per-
centage of GDP. This will be used as a proxy 
measure of government spending or gover-
nment expenditure in order to measure the 
effects of fiscal policy on the dependent va-
riables already described. Government con-
sumption is considered to be government 
purchases of goods and services for cur-
rent use (excluding military spending) and 
is considered to be a major portion of the 
gross domestic product Source: The herita-
ge Foundation. 
11. Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage 
of GDP. This will also be a proxy measure 
of fiscal policy, representing the respective 
government’s policy toward and ability to col-
lect taxes relative to the size of the economy 
(although not a problem in developed econo-
mies, in many developing economies the go-
vernment is hampered in its ability to collect 
tax revenues though lack of enforcement and 
proper tax codes). Source: Revenue Statistics, 
1965-2007 (2008). 
12. Budget Surplus/Deficit as a Percen-
tage of GDP (limited availability). This will 
be a comprehensive proxy for fiscal stance 
and policy. It is often thought that a large 
budget deficit can be an exogenous source of 
inflation. To maintain a similar basis for com-
parison for the long time period in question, 
again the variable “as a % of GDP” will be uti-
lized. Source: Budget of the U.S. Government. 
Fiscal year 2010. Office of Management and 
Budget (2009), International Monetary Fund 
IFS.
13. Forward Interest Rates (United Sta-
tes only). This is a proxy for market expec-
tations of future interest rates and general 
economic conditions. It is representative of 
financial market participants’ expectations. 
Knowledge of expectations helps a central 
bank to predict whether a particular policy 
decision is likely to surprise market partici-
pants and what their short-term response 
could perhaps be. Source: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New york. 
14. Central Bank Independence (Opera-
tional Date- United States only) - the U.S. Fe-
deral Reserve has been an autonomous entity 
for many years (prior to the beginning of this 
study). however, in 2000 reforms were pas-
sed that may have increased the operational 
independence of the Federal Reserve. 
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 2.2 Regression 
Regression analysis is one of the most 
useful econometric techniques in practice. 
According to Gujarati (2003), “Regression 
analysis is concerned with the study of the 
dependence of one variable, the dependent 
variable, on one or more other variables, the 
explanatory variables, with a view to estima-
ting and/or predicting the mean or average 
value of the former in terms of the known or 
fixed (in repeated sampling) values of the lat-
ter” (p. 18). The basic individual regression in 
this study will take the following form:
y = α + β
1
CBI1 + β
2 
CBI
2 
+ β3 CBI3 + … + ε 
The specific regressions given the inde-
pendent variables described above will be the 
following:
Inflation Rate = α – β1Development 
Dummy – β2Modified Cukierman Index - 
β3GMT Index -  β4Foreign Exchange Rate Re-
gime Dummy + β5Financial Crisis Dummy + 
β6International Inflation Dummy – β7Legal 
Central Bank Independence Dummy + 
β8Central Bank Governor Turnover – β9IT 
Dummy +  β10Cons – β11TaxRev + ε
GDP Volume Index = α + β1Development 
Dummy + β2Modified Cukierman Index +  β3 
GMT Index +  β4Foreign Exchange Rate Re-
gime Dummy – β5Financial Crisis Dummy 
– β6International Inflation Dummy + β7Legal 
Central Bank Independence Dummy – 
β8Central Bank Governor Turnover + β9IT 
Dummy -  β10Cons + β11TaxRev + ε
Unemployment % = α – β1Development 
Dummy – β2Modified Cukierman Index -  β3 
GMT Index -  β4 Foreign Exchange Rate Regi-
me Dummy + β5Financial Crisis Dummy + 
β6International Inflation Dummy – β7Legal 
Central Bank Independence Dummy + 
β8Central Bank Governor Turnover – β9IT 
Dummy +  β10Cons – β11TaxRev + ε 
 3 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
 3.1 External impacts
For the next set of hypotheses, a represen-
tative country for each level will be examined 
for Inflation, GDP Volume and Unemploy-
ment to ascertain to what degree (if any) the-
se variables are influenced by the fiscal policy 
variable in question.
3.1.1 Fiscal Policy
H1- There is stronger evidence of CBI effective-
ness among countries that have a higher level of Tax 
Revenue amassed by the government (Table 1a ). 
There is some evidence regarding Infla-
tion and CBI effectiveness when examined 
through Tax Revenue levels (as seen in the 
case of New Zealand). This also lends sup-
port to fiscal policy theory (i.e. a decrease/
increase in taxes is part of expansionary/
contractionary fiscal policy, leading to more/
less output and, in many cases, higher/lower 
inflation levels) that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between Tax Revenue and Inflation 
at the highest Tax Revenue level. 
b) GDP Growth (Table 1b ).
Table 1a  Inflation results: tax revenue 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .32 1.16 FXD (.99), GMT (-.16)
Medium High (Malaysia) .23 1.51 II (.91), IT (4.52), FXD (.87)
Medium (Mexico) .66 1.16 CBGov (-.01), DD (-3.63), II (.06)
Medium Low (Philippines) .45 1.55 CBGov (-.76), FCD (1.51), II (.92)
Low (India) .40 1.92 FCD (1.68), II (.73), IT (2.43)
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Table 1b  GDP volume index results: tax revenue 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .07 2.45 FCD (-1.19)
Medium High (Malaysia) .19 2.10 FCD (-1.98), IT (-12.10)
Medium (Mexico) .12 3.40 DD (22.60), FCD (-2.88), Surplus (-1.16)
Medium Low (Philippines) .01 3.24 None
Low (India) .03 1.87 None
There is no evidence of greater/less CBI 
effectiveness as it pertains to level of Tax Re-
venue amassed by the government. however, 
it is of note that the Financial Crisis Dummy 
variable is consistently statistically negatively 
related to GDP growth throughout. 
 
c) Unemployment (Table 1c ).
Legal CBI effectiveness as it relates to 
Unemployment can be observed at the Me-
dium high Level of Tax Revenue. The Finan-
cial Crisis Dummy also appears. 
H2- There is stronger evidence of CBI effec-
tiveness among countries that have a higher le-
vel of Government Consumption (Table 2a ).
Table 1c  Unemployment results: tax revenue 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .08 2.33 None
Medium High (Malaysia) .14 2.47 LCBI (-.22), FXD (.33)
Medium (Mexico) .14 2.92 Surplus (.12)
Medium Low (Philippines) .00 2.80 None
Low (India) Not Available
There is no evidence of greater legal 
or operational CBI effectiveness at higher 
levels of Government Consumption. ho-
wever, it is noteworthy that at higher le-
vels of Government Consumption, the 
coefficients support fiscal policy theory. 
In other words, an increase in government 
consumption (i.e. demand) tends to lead to 
an increase in inflation. however, at lower 
levels of consumption, perhaps this does 
not hold true. In other words, there may 
exist a type of “breaking point” related to 
inflation as consumption increases. It is 
also noteworthy that there is a strong sta-
tistical correlation between international 
inflation levels (as denoted by the variable 
Table 2a  Inflation results: government consumption 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .26 1.72
DD (1.80), FCD (-.64), 
Cons (.07), II (.78), LCBI (.66)
Medium High (Brazil) .46 1.06 GMT (2.36), II (9.11)
Medium (China) .19 .96 DD(22.74), FXD (4.53)
Medium Low (India) .40 1.92 FCD (1.68), II (.73), IT (2.43)
Low (Argentina) .51 .98
CBGov (.00), DD (-.01), FCD (.00), 
GMT (-10.26), Cons (.00), II (.73), LCBI 
(62.06), MCI (8.06), TaxRev (6.11)
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“II”) and country inflation in the case of 
Brazil, which was deemed to possess me-
dium high levels of government consump-
tion (although not causal proof, it perhaps 
signifies that international inflation levels 
may have influenced levels in this country 
over the years).  
b) GDP Growth (Table 2b ).
There is no evidence of greater CBI effec-
tiveness at higher levels of Government Con-
sumption as it pertains to GDP Volume.
c) Unemployment (Table 2c ).
There is no evidence of greater CBI effec-
tiveness at higher levels of Consumption as 
it relates to Unemployment. however, again, 
the Financial Crisis variable is positively 
correlated with Unemployment (in the case 
of Low Consumption).  
Table 2b  GDP volume index results: government consumption 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .11 2.20 II (-.64), TaxRev (.14)
Medium High (Brazil) Unavailable
Medium (China) Unavailable
Medium Low (India) .03 1.87 None
Low (Argentina) .04 3.15 None
Table 2c  Unemployment results: government consumption 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .09 1.82 None
Medium High (Brazil) .10 2.06 None
Medium (China) .10 2.13 FXD (-.20)
Medium Low (India) Not Available
Low (Argentina) .17 2.26 FCD (.75), II (1.64), TaxRev (-.70)
3.1.2 Social and political factors
For the next set of hypotheses, a re-
presentative country for each level will be 
examined for Inflation, GDP Volume and 
Unemployment to ascertain to what de-
gree (if any) these variables are influenced 
by the social and political factors in ques-
tion.
H3- There is stronger evidence of CBI effec-
tiveness among countries with lower levels of 
Corruption. 
a) Inflation (Table 3a ).
As can be seen, the effect of legal and/
or operational independence is modera-
tely strong at low levels of corruption but 
loses strength as corruption levels increa-
se. For example, in the case of Brazil, whi-
ch is classified as having medium levels 
Table 3a  Inflation results: corruption levels 
Level  R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
Low  (New Zealand) .32 1.16 FXD (.99), GMT (-.16)
Medium (Brazil) .46 1.06 GMT (2.36), II (9.11)
High (Argentina) .51 .98
CBGov (.00), DD (-.01), FCD (.00), 
GMT (-10.26), Cons (.00), II (.73), 
LCBI (62.06), MCI (8.06), TaxRev (6.11)
RCF_v21n54_miolo.indb   58 21/1/2011   08:02:29
The external impacts of Central Bank independence
Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, USP, São Paulo, v. 21, n. 54, p. 51-63, setembro/dezembro 2010
59
of corruption, the GMT index is actually 
positively correlated with inflation in this 
analysis. 
b) GDP Growth (Table 3b ).
There is no evidence of greater CBI effec-
tiveness on GDP growth when examined by 
levels of country corruption. 
c) Unemployment (Table 3c ).
There is no evidence of greater CBI effec-
tiveness in low corruption countries as it 
pertains to Unemployment. however, there 
is evidence of correlation between financial 
crises and Unemployment in high corrup-
tion countries. 
Table 3b  GDP volume index results: corruption levels 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
Low (New Zealand) .07 2.45 FCD (-1.19)
Medium (Brazil) Not Available
High (Argentina) .04 3.15 None
Table 3c  Unemployment results: corruption levels 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
Low (New Zealand) .08 2.33 None
Medium (Brazil) .10 2.06 None
High (Argentina) .17 2.26 FCD (.75), II (1.64), TaxRev (-.70)
Table 4a  Inflation results: legal system 
Legal System Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
English Common (U.S.) .38 2.17 Cons (.49), Deficit (.52), Forward (.20)
French Civil (Mexico) .74 1.50
DD (-5.36), FCD (.61), FXD (3.34), GMT 
(.96), II (.64), LCBI (-5.93), TaxRev (-.29)
Germanic (Japan) .36 2.17
DD(-1.58), FCD (.42), II (1.51), LCBI 
(-1.05), MCI (6.70), TaxRev (-.06)
H4- There is stronger evidence of CBI 
effectiveness among countries operating un-
der English Common Law than other types of 
legal systems.
a) Inflation (Table 4a ). 
Regarding Inflation, there is conflicting 
evidence. In other words, there is evidence of 
operational and legal CBI with coefficients of 
different directions (in French Civil and Ger-
manic Law countries). 
b) GDP Growth (Table 4b ).
In the area of economic growth, there is 
no evidence of greater CBI effectiveness as it 
pertains to legal systems. 
Table 4b  GDP volume index results: legal system 
Legal System Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
English Common (U.S.) .51 2.22
Cons (.35), II (-1.07), Surplus (.19), 
OCBI (-8.57), Forward (.26)
French Civil (Mexico) .12 3.40 DD (22.60), FCD (-2.88), Surplus (-1.16)
Germanic (Japan) .01 2.60 None
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c) Unemployment (Table 4c ).
There seems to be a mixed pattern regar-
ding Unemployment and CBI here as well. 
H5- There is stronger evidence of CBI effec-
tiveness among countries operating under In-
flation Targeting regimes.  
a) Inflation (Table 5a ).
Although intuitively, one might think 
that countries operating under high in-
flation targeting regimes would also see 
greater CBI effectiveness related to Infla-
tion, there is no evidence to support this. 
however, there is actually a negative rela-
tionship between FCD and Inflation in En-
gland (high IT); leading one to think that 
perhaps an IT regime is useful under cer-
tain circumstances. 
b) GDP Growth (Table 5b ).
c) Unemployment (Table 5c ).
There is no evidence to support the hypo-
thesis of greater CBI effectiveness under high 
IT regimes as it relates to either GDP growth 
or Unemployment.
H6- There is stronger evidence of CBI effec-
tiveness among countries operating under a 
medium level of constraints than either a high 
or low level of constraints. 
Table 5c  Unemployment results: inflation targeting 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .09 1.82 None
Medium (U.S.) .44 2.80 Cons (-.40), Surplus (-.42)
Low (India) Not Available
Table 4c  Unemployment results: legal system 
Legal System Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
English Common (U.S.) .44 2.80 Cons (-.40), Surplus (-.42)
French Civil (Mexico) .14 2.92 Surplus (.12)
Germanic (Japan) .13 2.27
DD (-.95), GMT (.13), 
LCBI (.40), MCI (-1.77)
Table 5a  Inflation results: inflation targeting 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .26 1.72
DD (1.80), FCD (-.64), 
Cons (.07), II (.78), LCBI (.66)
Medium (U.S.) .38 2.17 Cons (.49), Deficit (.52), Forward (.20)
Low (India) .40 1.92 FCD (1.68), II (.73), IT (2.43)
Table 5b  GDP volume index results: inflation targeting 
Level Adj. R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (England) .11 2.20 II (-.64), TaxRev (.14)
Medium (U.S.) .51 2.22
Cons (.35), II (-1.07), Surplus (.19), 
OCBI (-8.57), Forward (.26)
Low (India) .03 1.87 None
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a) Inflation (Table 6a ). 
There is some evidence that there is gre-
ater CBI effectiveness under high constraint 
levels as it relates to Inflation.
b) GDP Growth (Table 6b ).
c) Unemployment (Table 6c ).
There is no evidence that there is any grea-
ter CBI effectiveness for GDP growth or Unem-
ployment as they pertain to constraint levels. 
H7- There is stronger evidence of CBI effec-
tiveness among countries that are more econo-
mically developed (Table 7a ).
As can be seen above, there is moderate 
evidence that countries that are more econo-
mically developed have greater CBI effective-
ness in regards to Inflation. 
b) GDP Growth (Table 7b ).
c) Unemployment (Table 7c ).
Table 6a  Inflation results: constraint level 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .32 1.16 FXD (.99), GMT (-.16)
Medium High (U.S.) .38 2.17 Cons (.49), Deficit (.52), Forward (.20)
Medium (Mexico) .66 1.16 CBGov (-.01), DD (-3.63), II (.06)
Medium Low (China) .19 .96 DD(22.74), FXD (4.53)
Low (Indonesia) .43 1.29 FCD (2.49), IT (6.55), FXD (2.07)
Table 6b  GDP volume index results: constraint level 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .07 2.45 FCD (-1.19)
Medium High (U.S.) .51 2.22 Cons (.35), II (-1.07), Surplus (.19), OCBI (-8.57), Forward (.26)
Medium (Mexico) .12 3.40 DD (22.60), FCD (-2.88), Surplus (-1.16)
Medium Low (China) Unavailable
Low (Indonesia) .14 2.46 None
Table 6c  Unemployment results: constraint level 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (New Zealand) .08 2.33 None
Medium High (U.S.) .44 2.80 Cons (-.40), Surplus (-.42)
Medium (Mexico) .14 2.92 Surplus (.12)
Medium Low (China) .10 2.13 FXD (-.20)
Low (Indonesia) Unavailable
Table 7a  Inflation results: economic development 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (Japan) .36 2.17 DD(-1.58), FCD (.42), II (1.51), LCBI (-1.05), MCI (6.70), TaxRev (-.06)
Medium High (Spain) .18 2.51 CBGov (-1.40), FCD (-.68), Cons (.11), TaxRev (-.04)
Medium (Chile) .49 1.30 MCI (-1.41), II (1.26), DD (6.83)
Medium Low (Peru) .13 1.66 None
Low (Philippines) .45 1.55 FCD (1.51), CBGov (-.76), II (.92)
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Regarding GDP growth and Unemployment, 
there is little (or conflicting) evidence that there 
is any relationship between a country’s econo-
mic development and the effectiveness of CBI. 
Table 7b  GDP volume index results: economic development 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (Japan) .01 2.60 None
Medium High (Spain) .36 2.17
CBGov (-1.82), LCBI (-.78), 
IT (1.36), FCD (-1.16), TaxRev (.04)
Medium (Chile) .07 2.81 FCD (-1.21)
Medium Low (Peru) .03 1.75 None
Low (Philippines) .01 3.24 None
Table 7c  Unemployment results: economic development 
Level R2 DW Significant Variables (Coefficients)
High (Japan) .13 2.27
DD (-.95), GMT (.13), 
LCBI (.40), MCI (-1.77)
Medium High (Spain) .27 2.26 FCD (1.20), DD (2.72),  TaxRev (-.05)
Medium (Chile) .07 2.07 FXD (-2.66)
Medium Low (Peru) .02 1.66 None
Low (Philippines) .00 2.80 None
 4 CONCLUSION
The following figure is a summary of the fin-
dings from the above hypotheses (Figure 1 ).
The idea of central bank independence 
has been at the forefront of financial market 
liberalization since the late 1980s and is still 
quite relevant (hAAN et al., 2008). Many 
countries around the world, both developed 
and developing, have granted autonomy to 
their central banks in order to achieve mo-
netary and fiscal objectives. There are several 
1. Regarding Inflation and Unemployment, there seems to be some evidence that level of tax revenue is correlated 
with CBI effectiveness. However, there is no evidence regarding GDP growth. 
2. There is no evidence of greater CBI effectiveness in any of the three variables when examined under the lens of 
Government Consumption.
3. For Inflation, a low level of corruption is linked to CBI effectiveness (as expressed by operational and/or legal inde-
pendence). For GDP growth and Unemployment, there is no apparent link.  
4. There is little to no evidence of any difference in CBI effectiveness when examined on the basis of a country’s legal 
system.
5. There seems to be no clear link between CBI effectiveness and the level of Inflation Targeting as they relate to any 
of the key variables. 
6. Regarding Inflation, there is some evidence of greater CBI effectiveness under high constraint levels. For GDP gro-
wth and Unemployment, there is no evidence of a relationship. 
7. There is moderate support for greater CBI effectiveness in more economically developed countries as it relates to 
Inflation. However, there is little to no evidence of such regarding GDP growth or Unemployment.  
 
Figure 1  Summary of findings 
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general motives put forth in the literature as 
to what macroeconomic and political events 
drove countries to grant this authority. ho-
wever, the results in the early literature on 
the subject, with some exceptions, seemed 
to come to a common conclusion that an in-
crease in central bank independence would 
lead to a lowering in inflation rates. however, 
much of the early work was done in the ear-
ly to mid-1990s, before many of the develo-
ping and developed world’s central banks had 
achieved independence. 
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